The Antifa movement today

Four years ago, I wrote an article about the original antifa movement, Antifaschistische Aktion, in Germany in 1932-33 (Karvala 2015). At the end I said: “In a future article we will look at how sectors of the current antifascist movement repeat many of the mistakes of the past, running the risk of repeating the same tragic end.” For many reasons, I never got round to writing the promised article. It would have been a huge challenge to try to summarize and evaluate the activities of the international antifascist movement over more than thirty years.

Mark Bray’s book, Antifa: The antifascist handbook, by explaining many of the movement’s activities and ideas, simplifies the job considerably. Thus this text is half a partial honoring of the promise made four years ago, and half a reflection on Bray’s book. I wrote it specifically for my book The antifascism of the 99% (El antifascismo del 99%, Barcelona: Ediciones de la Tempestad, 2019).

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Why follow the model of Antifascist Action?

Who is an antifascist?

Antifa as an identity

Direct action

Ideas will not stop fascism

Broad independent movements or wholly owned subsidiaries?

The fascists are more worried by united antifascist movements than by direct action

Antifa positions on international issues

Notes on “The antifascist handbook”
    Philosophy
    Sexism
    Is fascism the same as white supremacism?
    Broaden our vision

Antifa and the fight against fascism today

Bibliography

Notes

With his book, Antifa: The antifascist handbook, Mark Bray has done a great service by collecting testimonies from dozens of activists and describing many actions of today’s antifa movement: I say this despite the many doubts I have about his arguments.

The truth is that unwittingly, Bray has revealed — with a lot more examples and detail than I could have gathered — different contradictions and limitations of the antifa movement.

For example:

• Many antifa activists declare themselves libertarian, but their methods sometimes reflect a quite authoritarian attitude.
• They insist on the need for an anticapitalist ideology to combat fascism, but the centrality within the antifa vision of physical action in the street — which does not depend at all on this ideology — often attracts people, especially men, who are more interested in physical combat than in political ideas.
• Many antifa groups define as fascist many different forces — mainstream parties, the police, the prison system, immigration controls, LGBTIphobia, capitalism in general… — that have much more social weight than the small neo-Nazi groups, but antifa activity usually focuses on these small groups.
• Antifa groups define themselves as movements, and some antifa platforms are very hostile towards political parties, but in reality they are not broad social movements, but rather political groups, with their own program.
• They declare their wish for more people to join the fight against the far-right, but in practice they put many obstacles in the face of the expansion of the movement (partly due to the previous points).

All these contradictions (and others) can be seen in the trajectory of many antifa movements and are made clear in Bray’s book.

Before going any further, I must make one thing very clear. The criticisms that I will make should not be read as an attack on people who have shown massive dedication to the fight against fascism in different countries over recent decades. They often fought neo-Nazi groups when nobody else was doing so, and managed to expel them from many neighborhoods. Their commitment and achievements should not be underestimated.

The argument posed here is that in the face of a growing far-right, which is much more extensive than the neo-Nazi street gangs, a very different strategy is needed. This is even recognized by many of the testimonies collected by Bray: the problem is that Bray and his testimonies only look for solutions within the already established framework of antifa action when (in my opinion) the current challenges require going beyond this framework. That said, and as will be made clear towards the end of the article, such activists with long experience of antifascist struggle will be an essential part of the new movements that are needed.

Why follow the model of Antifascist Action?

My previous article (Karvala 2015) described the original antifascist movement, Antifaschistische Aktion, promoted by the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1932-1933. Suffice it to say that Antifa was launched in June 1932, allegedly as a unitary movement, but a few days later the KPD leadership declared: “Antifascist Action means untiring daily exposure of the shameless, treacherous role of the SPD… leaders who are the direct filthy helpers of fascism” (Rote Fahne, 1 July 1932, quoted in Gluckstein 1999, p115). Antifa was not a unitary movement against fascism, but rather an instrument of the German Communist Party, directed against both the Nazis and the Social Democrats [and also against the non Stalinist revolutionary left - author’s note to the US translation].

In any case, about six months after the creation of Antifa, Hitler came to power, almost without opposition. The Communist Party insisted that nothing had changed, that they had already been living under fascism before Hitler, and that the Nazis did not alter the situation significantly. Their slogan was “After Hitler, our turn”. When they discovered their mistake, it was too late. (All this is discussed in some detail in Karvala 2015.)

Many of these problems are recognized by Bray. In his very brief description of the original antifa movement, he makes the following comment: “Rank-and-file social democrats were welcomed into Antifaschistische Aktion, but the KPD was still instructing its operatives ‘to sabotage the Iron Front at every turn’.” (Bray 2017, p25. The Iron Front was the SPD’s own movement against fascism). It was this sectarianism — without forgetting the SPD’s disastrous position— that permitted the victory of Nazism.

This raises the question of why precisely this strategy has been taken as the model to copy. But this question is almost never asked, or at least Bray doesn’t ask it. He describes the failures of the antifa strategy, but takes it for granted that this is the strategy that must be followed: Bray himself defends the overall antifa vision, which led to defeat.

In doing so, Bray rewrites history. For example, he writes that “The first substantive recognition of the essence of the fascist peril came with the ‘February Uprising’ of 1934 [in Vienna]”. (Bray 2017, p133).

Already in 1923, the German revolutionary Clara Zetkin had written:

In Fascism, the proletariat is confronted by an extraordinarily dangerous enemy. Fascism is the concentrated expression of the general offensive undertaken by the world bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Its overthrow is therefore an absolute necessity… the whole of the proletariat must concentrate on the fight against Fascism. It will be much easier for us to defeat Fascism if we clearly and distinctly study its nature. Hitherto there have been extremely vague ideas upon this subject not only among the large masses of the workers, but even among the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat and the Communists. (Zetkin 1923; my emphasis).

Zetkin insists here that fascism represents a specific threat and also insists on working class unity to fight it; Stalinist policies in 1928-1934 rejected both of these arguments.

Trotsky, with growing insistence, tried to apply this argument to the critical situation in Germany in the early 1930s. He wrote in “The Impending Danger of Fascism in Germany: A Letter to a German Communist Worker on the United Front against Hitler”: “Should Fascism achieve power it will ride over your skulls and spines like a frightful tank. Your salvation lies in merciless struggle. And only unity in struggle with the social democratic workers can bring victory.” (Trotsky 1931). The small Trotskyist group in Germany fought to establish united movements along these lines. They had some local successes but the KPD responded with hostility and violence, doing everything it could to prevent these efforts (see Karvala 2015). Their experience was almost forgotten for many decades.[1]

The reasons behind much of the radical left adopting the disastrous strategy of Antifa, ignoring the arguments of Zetkin and especially of Trotsky, have to do with the continued influence of Stalinism in left ideas (Karvala 2012b). The tragedy even goes further. When activists try to break from the sectarian errors of the Antifa model, the alternative is usually posed in terms of the other disastrous Stalinist policy in the face of fascism, the popular front. And when they have had enough of the monolithic vision of uniformity and submission to the “progressive” bourgeoisie implied by the popular front… they return to the sectarian antifa model.

The paradox is that the antifa vision is not only hegemonic among communist orthodox groups, but also among other sectors of the radical left, such as anarchists, and even the majority of Trotskyist groups. This is not the place to attempt to explain why all these groups adopt a model created by Stalinism.

The point is to pose the question: why copy a strategy that contributed to the greatest defeat, almost without resistance, in the history of the international labor movement?

Who is an antifascist?

At the beginning of his book, Bray warns against the idea that the term “antifascist” applies to any person who fights against fascism. He insists on “understanding… antifascism as a method of politics, a locus of individual and group self-identification, and a transnational movement… [of] socialist, anarchist, and communist currents… This political interpretation transcends the flattening dynamics of reducing antifascism to the simple negation of fascism…” Therefore, he explains, his book is limited to covering “a broad antifascist current that exists at the intersection of pan-socialist politics and direct-action strategy. This tendency is often called ‘radical antifascism’ in France, ‘autonomous antifascism’ in Germany, and ‘militant antifascism’ in the United States, the U.K., and Italy, among today’s antifa (the shorthand for antifascist in many languages).” (Bray 2017, pp.xiv-xv)

This is even clearer in a footnote: “I do not focus on the institutional ‘antiracist’ movement of organizations like SOS Racisme or formal antifascist organizations affiliated with political parties like Unite Against Fascism.” (Bray 2017, p228. It is not clear why he puts “antiracist” in quotes.)

This problem of terminology arises in many fields of social struggle. I comment in another text that according to one definition “to be a feminist simply implies to be against the oppression of women, so that any consequently progressive person — man or woman — would be feminist.” However, the term has another, much more limited definition, according to which all men benefit from oppressing all women, who might even be defined as a class: “With this variant, it would not make sense for a man to define himself as feminist: he would be acting against his own interests.” (Karvala 2012a).

The anti-war movement was huge, involving people from far beyond traditional pacifism, but some people referred to it as a big “pacifist movement”. Sometimes Gandhian pacifist activists tried to impose their ideology of nonviolence on the whole movement, for example, by proposing that conditions be placed on solidarity with the resistance of the Iraqi people. When adding up our forces, a broad definition (“a pacifist demonstration of one million people”) was preferred; but when it came to deciding strategies, attempts were made to use the narrow definition so as to impose a very specific ideology on the whole movement.

The same thing occurs here. In general, activists use the exclusive definition of who is and is not antifascist: often just by default, sometimes explicitly as in Bray’s book. But in some circumstances — for example, when faced with a severe case of repression — a slogan such as “We are all antifascists” is used. A protest might even be called with this slogan. But almost without exception, the discourse that accompanies the action is not that of “all”, but goes back to reflecting a (specific) radical minority.

The concept of “99%” — as against the 1% of the population that controls the world — was coined by the Occupy movement in the United States (a movement in which Mark Bray participated, by the way). To talk about “the antifascism of the 99%” implies, of course, a bit of exaggeration, but it gives an idea of ​​the aim of creating a really broad movement.

The insistence that antifascism has to be revolutionary and anti-capitalist is also a declaration of intentions. It is clear that, despite occasional short term operations of broadening out (to which we will return), the classical vision restricts the definition of “antifascist” to a very, very small percentage of the population. With a population in the Spanish State of about forty-six million, there would have to be 46,000 revolutionary antifascists to reach 0.1% [The figure for the USA would be nearly 330,000 people, with half of them being women… - author’s note to the US translation]. The actual figure is probably closer to 0.01%. The entire radical left is a minority, of course. The question is whether we recognize that we are currently a very small minority, and that we must relate to more diverse people — openly and honestly — if we want to carry out significant struggles, or if we reinforce and almost celebrate our minority position.

Antifa as an identity

The previous point leads us to another question: which issues do antifascist groups feel most identified with, and are most likely to provoke a response by them?

Bray recommends a “guide” to forming an antifascist group, published by the US group “It’s Going Down.” The “Obligations” section consists of four points. One of them is “Support other antifascists who are targeted by fascists or arrested for antifa-related activities.” (It’s Going Down, 2017).

You have to ask yourself, why limit it this way, saying “support other antifascists who are targeted by fascists”? As we already know that the term “antifascists” does not apply to anyone who is simply against fascism, it is actually quite a severe restriction. It might be thought that it is a mistake, that any victim of fascist aggressions would receive the same support. In principle, antifa groups do oppose any fascist aggression, but the truth is that their reaction is generally much stronger if they feel that the victim of the aggression is “one of their own”.

In January 2013, Golden Dawn neo-Nazis murdered the young Pakistani worker, Shehzad Luqman, in Athens. KEERFA, the united movement against fascism and racism, which includes the Pakistani Community of Greece as an important affiliated body, did respond with protests. However, the murder did not provoke much reaction from the antifa movement or, indeed, from the rest of the left or social movements. On the other hand, the killing by neo-Nazis of Pavlos Fyssas in September 2013 — neither more nor less tragic than that of Luqman — unleashed a wave of protests that went way beyond KEERFA, to include the antifa movement and even the trade unions. The point is that Pavlos Fyssas was a known rapper, associated with the antifa struggle.

Thanasis Kampagiannis, KEERFA’s lawyer in the popular prosecution of Golden Dawn, said: “We are clear that we have only achieved this trial, and we can only participate in it, thanks to the social mobilization following the murder of Pavlos Fyssas” (La Directa, 23/10/2014). Of course it is positive that there were massive mobilizations after the murder of Fyssas: the trial, which still continues today, has contributed to weakening the neo-Nazi organization.

But the question cannot be avoided: why did the movements as a whole — and especially the antifa movement, which is supposed to specialize in these issues — not react in the same way eight months before? It would seem that the condition mentioned in the “antifascist guide” does have an effect.

Houria Bouteldja explains another example of the same double standard:

Last June, far-right groups took part in a series of aggressions against veiled women in the suburbs of Paris, and this resulted in very few reactions. Only women were targeted and one of them even lost her baby. Antifascists did not react much and neither did the feminists, if we exclude a small minority of them. Around the same time, a young white antifascist man, Clément Méric, was attacked and killed by the same ultra right-wing circles. There, the reaction was immediate and the emotion was such that the affair rapidly gained national attention. Of course, we were dealing with a murder. I am not here questioning the legitimacy of the rage that gripped antifascist circles. But we observe that left-wing circles, antifascists and antiracists strongly mobilized to protest against the murder of Clément Méric in all large French cities but were terribly absent from the demonstrations organized by Muslims. It is a bitter matter of fact but it is not new. (Bouteldja 2014)

This attitude must be contrasted with what Lenin argued more than a century ago (he was fighting a narrowly economistic vision of socialist activity and struggle), insisting that it was necessary to “respond to all cases of tyranny, oppression, violence, and abuse, no matter what class is affected” (Lenin 1902).

Finally, let us consider the second part of the sentence in the guide: “Support other antifascists who are… arrested for antifa-related activities.” Quite often it seems that the condition expressed here (in italics) is not applied, that any arrest of an antifa activist leads the movement to mobilize in their support, whether or not it is an issue related to the fight against the far-right [This is the experience in the Spanish state, it may be different in the USA - author’s note to the US translation]. Some antifa platforms spend more time protesting against the repression they suffer than fighting fascist groups.

It’s necessary to insist that it would be wrong to generalize and that within the antifa movement there are many people who are very committed to the fight against fascism. But it cannot be denied that there also exists, among some antifa activists, this tendency to understand antifascism as “anything that an antifa activist does”, not as “any person who fights against fascism.” And this flows from the narrow definition of antifascism defended by Bray and by many people in the movement.

Direct action

“Direct action” is a key element in the viewpoint and self image of the antifa movement and, as we have seen, Bray includes “direct-action strategy” in his definition of antifascism. (Bray 2017, pp.xiv)

But really “direct action” is not a strategy, but rather a tactic, on the same level as bill posting, handing out leaflets, organizing demonstrations or public meetings, etc. These are all specific actions that should be part of a global strategy about how to advance. This is perhaps the first warning: it is a serious mistake to convert into a principle something that is simply one of the possible forms of action that may be useful at one time or another.

There is typically an insistence on the combination of direct action and anti-capitalist or revolutionary ideology, but in reality fighting fascism in the street has no necessary connection to opposing capitalism.

An excellent example of antifascism based on direct action was the 43 Group, formed in London just after World War II, in response to the resurgence of fascism in Britain. The group went about sabotaging, using physical force, fascist events. They were very effective. They had “commandos, on call day and night to disrupt meetings and carry out raids.” A network of London taxi drivers informed them of fascist rallies and even took them there. Upon arrival, they used almost military tactics to attack the organizers, tear down the platform and bring the meeting to an end (Gould 2009). Another source explains that “armed with clubs, razors, bricks, knuckledusters, broken bottles, knives and everything except guns and bombs, the 43 Group tracked down Fascist meetings to quash them.” (Roberts 2008). The 43 Group was mainly made up of Jewish former soldiers; the commandos included former Royal Marines, paratroopers etc. Far from being anti-capitalist, some members of the 43 Group were Zionists and later went to Palestine to join terrorist groups and fight for the creation of the Israeli State (Silver 2002).

Bray speaks enthusiastically of this group, which he describes as a “militant anti-fascist organization” (Bray 2017, p42). This is despite the fact that the group was not anticapitalist and thus didn’t comply with Bray’s own definition of antifascism. For the 43 Group, the lack of revolutionary ideology clearly was not an obstacle. Doesn’t this demonstrate that this criterion makes no sense? If the key is direct action, that is, physical attacks (a viewpoint I do not share as a general rule), then anticapitalist ideas really are irrelevant. The exceptional effectiveness of this group, compared to many other examples of direct action, is a result of the composition of the group: former soldiers with combat experience and military discipline. In addition, in Great Britain just after the war, the fact they were former soldiers would have given them a certain protection from the police that a typical antifa group today would not have. The 43 Group fulfilled its function excellently at that time, but it is not a model that can be applied generally.

The “antifascist guide” quoted earlier, after giving advice on the use of guns, in fact warns:

Be wary of people who just want to fight. Physically confronting and defending against fascists is a necessary part of anti-fascist work, but is not the only or even necessarily the most important part. Macho posturing and an overemphasis on picking fights and physical combat can be reckless, un-strategic, and unnecessarily dangerous for your group. (It’s Going Down, 2017).

The most important thing are the political problems associated with this tactic. A Swedish activist explained (from jail!):

I think anti-fascism in Sweden is a bit stuck. I think we should find new ways. Somewhere between 2005 and 2010 we got stuck. We saw that violence was effective and we got stuck in that pattern . . . [fascists] moved to other arenas and we were still stuck in our ways. Violent tactics do not work on everything. Violence is still a tool but should only be used when needed. We needed to restructure and think of new ways to confront them. But we didn’t do that, so now it feels like we are falling behind. They are leading the way and we are chasing after them. (Bray 2017, p93).

A German activist said it more clearly:

[antifa] ‘military’ tactics do not work if you face fifteen thousand people in Dresden or a party that can win 20 percent of the vote (Bray 2017, p84).

Luckily, precisely in Dresden, very different tactics have been successfully applied since 2010: citizens’ blockades promoted by a unitary movement that includes unions, parliamentary left parties such as Die Linke and the SPD… (Schnell 2010). This movement thus falls completely outside Bray’s definition of antifascism… but it works.

A strategy centered on street fighting has a fundamental problem regarding who is the subject of struggle. It converts most people into mere spectators, passively observing a militant fighting minority that acts — presumably — in their name. Bray quotes a US activist who is in favor of a broader movement:

“Not everyone who is anti-fascist is gonna be able to mask up and go smash things,” explained Joe from the North Carolina GDC. “There have to be roles for elderly folks, disabled folks who are not going to be able to hit the streets.” (Bray 2017, pp118-119)

This vision of an antifascist hard core willing to “mask up and go smash things”, as against the elderly or disabled for whom we have to find “other roles” — despite the good intentions of the speaker — shows clearly the elitism implicit in focusing the struggle on street fighting. In addition, in a society in which physical strength and violence are associated with masculinity, the emphasis on street fighting often feeds macho attitudes within antifascist movements; something recognized by several of the testimonies in Bray’s book and also mentioned in the antifa guide cited above. [We will return briefly to this point later - author’s note to the US translation.]

In any case, to combat a growing far-right, which is building mainly through electoral methods, very different strategies are needed, in which physical fighting is far from being the main element.

Ideas will not stop fascism

German Marxist playwright Bertolt Brecht is often quoted as saying: “How can anyone tell the truth about Fascism, unless he is willing to speak out against capitalism, which brings it forth?” Of course, the radical left must “speak out against” and fight capitalism. The problem is that speaking out in itself does not change things. We will see this more clearly if we consider another struggle.

In 2003, faced with the threat of the war in Iraq, massive broad antiwar movements were built, with the historic demonstration of more than thirty-five million people worldwide on February 15, 2003. They didn’t stop the war, but over the medium term, the mobilizations had important effects. The following year, for example, Spanish troops were withdrawn from Iraq, and more recently the British government rejected a US proposal to attack Syria, fearing that those mobilizations would be repeated. The point is that in 2003, there were also sectors that insisted on the connection between war and capitalism (in this they were right) and argued that you couldn’t oppose the war unless you also opposed capitalism (and here they were totally confused). The great impact of the antiwar movement was due to it being so large and broad; it was by no means limited to the radical left.

The “anti-capitalist” argument is saying, in effect, that what changes things is not the mobilization of many people, but the ideas (the theories about the connection between capitalism and war, or fascism) in the heads of a few people. In philosophical terms, it is an idealistic viewpoint; the belief that ideas in themselves determine what happens in the world.

Analyses about the origin of war, and fascism, are important, and can help guide the people who share these analyses. They help us to understand why the struggles against fascism (and also against war) should not depend on the liberal bourgeoisie, because their basic interests lead them in a different direction. But the alternative must be a movement based, not on the 0.01% of committed anticapitalists, but on working people in general. And as we know, currently, the vast majority of the working class is neither revolutionary nor anticapitalist.

The paradox is that while some antifa activists assert their identity with T-shirts saying “Working Class Pride” and stuff like that, it is the broad, united movements against fascism — that don’t declare their class orientation, still less are they anticapitalist — that can really involve a significant part of the real working class.

Broad independent movements or wholly owned subsidiaries?

Towards the end of his book, Bray gives more and more examples where the success of mobilizations depended on involving a wider range of people, beyond “militant antifascists” (see for example pp187-188). Many of the testimonies he quotes recognize this. This is positive: the problem is how this broadening of the movement is posed and what is the relationship between the more radical minority and the others.

Bray describes a model of concentric circles: “the first level of organizing is the ‘antifa radical group,’ and the second level is the ‘antifa collective,’ such as Vigilances 69 in Lyon or Comité Antifa St-Etienne, mixing people from unions and community activists. Organizers in Toulouse are currently ‘experimenting’ with a third level, ‘the anti-fascist assembly,’ which groups together other activist and leftist organizations with antifa collectives.” (Bray 2017, p198).

The existence of different types of space should not in itself represent a problem. The members of a revolutionary Marxist group organize themselves on their own to decide their own analyses and strategies, and then participate in broader spaces (a union meeting, social movement, electoral coalition…) where they explain their proposals and try to convince other people to support them. The key point is that the broader movements must really be democratic, transparent and independent.

So various questions arise. Does the model of “circles” described above imply that the wider spaces really take their own decisions, as plural and autonomous movements? Or are the wider circles simply transmission belts for the central core of militants? Do the activists in the (second level) “antifascist collective” know about the existence of the smaller (first level) group? On what basis is the distinction made between people belonging to one level or another? (And who makes this distinction?!) Etcetera.

The vision laid out here recalls what the Russian anarchist Bakunin proposed 150 years ago. In public he denounced “authoritarianism”: in private he defended “the collective and invisible dictatorship of the allies… dictatorship that will be all the more healthy and powerful the less trappings of power it has and the less ostensible its character” (Bakunin, letter 1 April 1870, in Ribeille [ed.] 1978, p. 71).

In “Rules That Should Inspire a Revolutionist”, Bakunin declared:[2]

All comrades should have under them second- or third-degree revolutionists — i.e., comrades who are not completely initiated. These should be regarded as part of the common revolutionary capital placed at his disposal. This capital should, of course, be spent as economically as possible in order to derive from it the greatest possible profit. (Alcalde 2008).

Returning to the present, Bray cites, as examples of concentric circles, some cases from the Spanish State, such as the “Madrid Para Todas” initiative (“Madrid For All”). He describes this as a “large assemblage of neighborhood assemblies”, and in its demonstration on May 21, 2017 it did mobilize many more people than usually participate in the actions of the Madrid Antifascist Coordination. It was presented as a broad and diverse space. But on its Twitter, for example, it described itself as a “Space of convergence of several anti-capitalist organizations that fight racism and sexism” (@MadridParaTodas, my emphasis). If even the best example of a “broader space” that Bray can propose continues to restrict itself to anticapitalists, it is obvious that there are limits to that breadth. (In the list of groups that form the platform, no organization of black or migrant people appears, nor any LGTBI group.) In any case, it seems that Madrid Para Todas ceased to operate a couple of years ago.

This situation is already suggested in Bray’s book. In explaining how antifa groups should act he states: “Sometimes that involves mobilizing working-class and immigrant communities, sometimes it does not. But either way, anti-fascists believe that developing substantive popular support must stem from anti-fascist politics and anti-fascist action, not the other way around.” (Bray 2017, p203). In other words, any “unity” depends on the rest of the people accepting the policies decided internally by the hard core of antifascist activists.

By way of contrast, in Unitat Contra el Feixisme i el Racisme (Unity Against Racism and Fascism, the broad movement against the far right in Catalonia), neighborhood associations, migrants’ organizations, political parties, trade unions, etc., take part as full participants in the movement, on equal terms alongside activists from antifascist and anti-capitalist groups. No one has the right to impose conditions; strategies are agreed by broad consensus, on the sole basis of the united struggle against fascism and racism. Sometimes tensions appear, for example, when new people enter who are accustomed to much more homogeneous spaces, in which everyone shares the same political vision.

The attempts by antifa groups to create broader spaces can only work if they break with the logic of limiting antifascism to “anticapitalism plus direct action”; in this case they would approach the model of united movements like UCFR. If they don’t make that break, “broadening out” is a fiction.

The fascists are more worried by united antifascist movements than by direct action

In November 2015 the new local version of Unity Against Racism and Fascism (UCFR) was presented at a public event in Madrid. Sadly, so far, UCFR still has not consolidated itself in the Spanish capital.

The surprising thing is the alarm that was raised among sectors of the far-right given the possible creation of UCFR in Madrid. One neo-Nazi group offered its analysis to its followers. About classic antifascism it said: “Their cult of hatred and simple direct action, without objectives or doctrine, makes them fall prey to very violent and undisciplined groups… [of] autonomous groups without an ideological program, closer to an urban tribe or football gang than a political organization.” They spoke of an antifascist movement “worn out by stupid actions without objectives by radicals who have never gone beyond beating people up and burning containers, but without political results.” Of course, they mix some observations that have a certain truth with mere insults; they are neo-Nazis, after all.

What they say about UCFR also mixes elements of the truth with distortions, but again it is interesting to know what they think: “UCFR… does not hesitate to join liberals or social democrats in mobilizations against patriotic organizations, along the lines of the movements in Germany or England… So if violent antifascism has not managed to stop our activities, now they intend to complement that with institutional antifascism which is ‘non-violent’, but no less dangerous and effective. So the next thing that we will see is the closure of more [of our] social centers, bookstores and stores, as is already happening in Catalonia… So we are sure that these new obstacles are going to change the way we do politics in our organizations… It’s time to sort ourselves out and start working more with our heads and not with our hearts.”[3]

The key point is that the fascists themselves were more worried about a united movement capable of exerting social and political pressure than with minority actions in the street. It is a factor to bear in mind.


Spanish Communists alongside Serbian and French fascists in Donbass

Antifa positions on international issues

Fascism is increasingly organized internationally. To be effective, the fight against fascism also needs a global vision. However, the antifa movement has adopted some very questionable attitudes in relation to international politics.

One of the movement’s favorite causes is that of Donbass, the mainly Russian speaking territory in eastern Ukraine in conflict with the central government. The conflict with Kiev — where the far-right is in fact very strong — has been defined as an antifascist struggle and there has even been talk of “international brigades”, like those that fought for the Spanish republic against Franco in the 1930s. The problem is that there are also fascists in Donbass: the fight against Kiev includes strong elements of Russian nationalism, including Russian neo-Nazis, and has the support of a large section of European fascism.

A report in the left wing Basque newspaper Gara (December 7, 2014) found within the pro Donbass militias former members of the French foreign legion, including far-right Serbian and French volunteers; pan-Russian activists, with far-right symbology; and the Vostok battalion, whose symbols mix the Soviet and the Tsarist flags. The militias have also included Communists from the Spanish State: the website of the Madrid Antifascist Coordination published (on August 23, 2014) a statement from Donetsk signed by the “Carlos Palomino International Brigade” [Carlos Palomino was a young antifascist murdered by a neo-Nazi in Madrid in 2007 - author’s note to the US translation], while two Spanish communists fought in the Vostok battalion (El Mundo, August 10, 2014).

This doesn’t justify supporting the Kiev government either. But we do need to point out an enormous contradiction. In Western Europe, “militant antifascism” refuses to collaborate with reformist parties or the mainstream trade unions in the struggle against fascism, but in Donbass they fight literally shoulder to shoulder alongside the far-right. (For more on this —in Spanish— see Karvala 2014.)

We find more contradictions in the case of Rojava, the Kurdish region of ​​the Syrian state. According to Bray, in the antifa movement: “Regardless of their politics… [all] consider both ISIS and Turkish president Erdogan to be fascist, and the defense of the Rojava Revolution to be an anti-fascist struggle.” (Bray 2017, p127). In fact, while it still existed, in May 2016, the “broad space” of Madrid Para Todas organized a public meeting entitled “Fascism and Daesh: weapons of Zionism and imperialism”. Without minimizing the terrible acts of either Erdogan or Daesh, it is very simplistic to label them as “fascists.” The authoritarian government of Erdogan is part of a very complex political situation in Turkey (see Karakaş 2016).

ISIS, meanwhile, is a result of the destruction of the region driven, first, by the US occupation of Iraq, and then by the war against the Syrian people by Bashar al-Assad. It is not comparable to fascism; not because it’s better or worse, but simply because it’s a different phenomenon that requires different responses.[4] The strangest thing is that among the militias fighting ISIS, we again find a collaboration of communists and fascists, now joined by anarchists. Just read the [translated] titles of some press reports: “The Spanish far-right wants to be reborn with a ‘crusade’ against ISIS” (elconfidencial.com, August 19, 2016); “Spanish nationalists, anarchists, Falangists and Stalinists fight jointly in Syria” (publico.es, October 28, 2018). (For an analysis of the origins of ISIS, see Bragulat Vallverdú 2016).

This is not the place to study the issue, but the truth is that in their geostrategic vision, there are many parallels between some antifa Stalinists and fascism: both share the same obsession with the (Jewish) billionaire George Soros, they see conspiracies everywhere, and they support Russian imperialism against American imperialism. And both share a strongly Islamophobic attitude; activists of both groups wear the same sticker, “FCK ISIS”. Of course, ISIS does not represent Islam, but opposition to “Islamo-fascism” or “radical Islam” often leads to hostility against Muslim people in general, in the form of Islamophobia. All this should greatly worry the antifascist movement, but that doesn’t seem to be the case.

Notes on “The antifascist handbook”

This text is not intended as a general review of the book, but I’ll take this opportunity to make some general comments about it.

With the subtitle, “The anti-fascist handbook,” Mark Bray sets the bar very high. It is a very ambitious goal, which for me only he only achieves partially. As I said at the beginning, by gathering a variety of testimonies, he has done an important job of journalism. However, the testimonies raise many questions which Bray doesn’t analyze in depth, let alone answer. I will return to this.

Philosophy

For a book that aims to summarize several decades of international antifascist struggle he devotes an awful lot of space (24 pages; close to ten percent of the book!) to a fairly philosophical and abstract overview of current debates in the United States about freedom of expression and “No platform”: the argument that there should be no public space for fascism. That is followed by a chapter of another thirty pages discussing violence and nonviolence in a similar fashion.

The way these debates are treated reflects the separation between the small minority of the antifa movement and the mass of ordinary people. Can we justify our actions in ethical terms? What can we do so that more people understand and support our actions? Etcetera. However, a majority-based movement can deal with these issues in a practical way.

Concerning “freedom of expression” for fascists, Unite Against Fascism — the united platform against the far-right in Britain that Bray did not want to talk about — has since its inception had an agreed consensus position of denying public spaces to fascism. The broad movement in Catalonia, UCFR — of whose very existence Bray seems unaware, despite it bringing together more than 600 different trade union, neighborhood, youth, migrant, etc. organizations — agreed years ago on a statement based on the same principle: “We don’t want fascists on chat shows” (UCFR 2011).

When it arises, the issue of physical force should be treated in the same concrete way. In the face of an uprising like that of General Franco in 1936 Spain, is it right to fight with all the weapons available? Of course it is, and in such a situation the fight is not limited to small groups. In the face of the electoral growth of the far-right, however, arms don’t work: other methods are needed.

In summary, these issues can’t be resolved with abstract ethical reflections, but through collective debate in a broad movement, around a real live problem.

Sexism

After dedicating close to sixty pages to philosophical debates, Bray deals with the problem of sexism in the antifa movement in just three pages. As we can see from the comments he quotes, and as is shown by several recent debates in the antifa movements [at least in the Spanish state], it is a very real problem. The issue deserves a much more serious analysis than Bray gives it, and also more than there is room for here. A brief mention has been made above, but even so, something more must be said.

Bray quotes a female antifa activist who criticizes the “gender essentialism” implicit in associating direct action with masculinity and to a point she is right (Bray 2017, p193). It is a typical mistake (of which I am also guilty) to complain about “an excess of testosterone” in certain actions: really it’s not a question of biology but a social issue. However it is true that in this society there are ways of acting that are more associated with “machismo” and — as is actually widely recognized in the antifa movement — the fact of promoting forms of action that are very centered on physical clashes has contributed to creating macho environments in some antifa groups. This is related to a more general political problem of authoritarian and elitist ways of treating people, both towards the outside and within the antifa movement itself.

My opinion is that problems of this kind are the product of a political vision focused on action by a minority. Once this viewpoint is accepted, showing insulting and negative attitudes towards other — ordinary — people can be seen as bad manners, but not as politically harmful. On the other hand, for a strategy based on a broad movement, on the active, conscious and enthusiastic participation of women and men, of people with different sexual orientations, of different origins…, respect for all sorts of people is essential, not only in human terms, but also politically.

If you “already know what needs to be done and you just need people to do it” then you may decide that shouting at them or insulting them are appropriate methods (like what happens in the army, if we can judge by movies). On the other hand, if the success of the movement depends on the initiative and ideas of everyone, then acting like a sergeant major is not only unpleasant; it is counterproductive.

And all this is not resolved by documents in which one or other antifa group declares that it is “feminist.” As stated above, I think it arises from something fundamental in the antifa strategy, a strategy defended and reaffirmed by Bray.

I will cite some details by way of comparison. Now, as I write [February 2019], we are preparing an important UCFR demonstration. We posted it as a Facebook event to spread the call. So far at least it is a success. Over the first ten days about fifty thousand people saw the call. Facebook estimates that 59% are women and 41% men. Two thousand people responded, saying they would go to the demo or were interested; of these, 67% are women and 33% are men. These figures reflect a general reality of UCFR: it is a movement with a strong female participation. Nobody can say the same about the “radical antifa” movement. The whole issue deserves more consideration… and perhaps it deserved more than three pages in “The antifa handbook”.

Is fascism the same as white supremacism?

Bray frequently equates fascism and white supremacism (for example, Bray 2017, pp.xvii-xviii). Here he reflects the experience inside the United States, where it is an understandable simplification. But he once again shows a problematic tendency to present specific experiences from his part of the world as if they had universal validity.

In India, for example, there is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a far-right populist and Hindu nationalist organization, which has as allies groups that could be defined as fascists: Shiv Sena and RSS, far-right organizations involved in pogroms against the Muslim population (see the nuanced analysis of the topic in Harman 2004).

In the Middle East, there are also fascist-inspired parties. The Lebanese Phalange, the Kataeb Party, was founded in 1936, inspired by the Spanish Falange, Italian fascism and above all Nazi Germany (the founder, Pierre Gemayel had just returned from the Berlin Olympics): they had brown shirts, Hitler salutes, the whole shebang. In recent decades they have undergone major changes and divisions, but in 1982 the Lebanese Phalange carried out the massacre of perhaps two thousand people in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila in Beirut.

The Syrian National Socialist Party (SNSP) exists in both Syria and Lebanon. They prefer to translate their name as “Syrian Social Nationalist Party” and give the impression that they are really part of an Arab nationalist left. However, a friend of mine, a Lebanese gay socialist who was brutally assaulted in Beirut by members of SNSP, told me that really “they are neo-Nazis.” This organization has collaborated with the Spanish neo-Nazi group MSR.[5]

And now the far right is growing in different countries of Latin America.

It is not a question of demanding that Bray deal with all these cases, only that he acknowledge that his comments only apply (at most) to a specific place and time. The majority of the world’s population is not white, but a fascist organization could emerge in any capitalist country — that is to say, in any country in the world — regardless of the skin color of those involved. Therefore, to equate fascism to white supremacism is to misunderstand the problem.

On the other hand, we must avoid the frivolous use of the term “fascist”, applying it to phenomena that are something very different, because it can lead to grave confusions.

Let us not forget that at the same time as he insists on equating fascism and white supremacism, Bray accepts without question that Daesh and President Erdogan are fascists. We won’t waste time trying to make the armed Islamists in Syrian and Iraq, or the conservative Islamist president of Turkey, fit into a definition of “white.” This is just another example of Bray making declarations and offering definitions in one place… only to completely ignore them in another.

Broaden our vision

Perhaps the fundamental problem is something that has already been mentioned. At the beginning of his book, Bray excludes unitary movements against fascism from his analysis, limiting himself to “militant antifascism.” So when he deals with endemic problems of the antifa movement, such as its isolation and criminalization, he has already ruled out what could at least be considered as a possible solution: genuinely broaden the movement, beyond those sectors of the far left that currently make it up.

He does speak of a certain “broadening”, but he limits it to those people who will accept the viewpoint of militant antifascism. This is no use: the whole problem arises because it is precisely a very small minority that identify themselves in this way.

Bray points out some local successes, in some specific events, but even here, many of the victories occurred when the antifa movements carried out actions that weren’t based on anti-capitalism and direct action. He cites an example that illustrates many things. An antifa group was planning a protest against a neo-Nazi event. During the debate, a “woman of color in the group named Maya ‘pushed the idea of performance instead of beat-downs’… some of the men in the group thought the idea was ‘ridiculous’.” Luckily Maya won the debate. They managed to bring together thirty-five antifascists, together with local people. “The noise of anti-fascist drums and the chanting drowned out the Nazi bullhorn so that ‘their message was not heard.’ Maya remembered the action fondly for its ability to ‘shut it down in a way that more moderate folks could get behind’.” (Bray 2017, p187). Bray takes advantage of the anecdote to reflect on the use of sound in protests against fascism, but to me this seems far from being the key point. On the one hand, we see once again the gender aspect; a woman’s proposal that falls outside the antifa self image is ridiculed. On the other, the success was the result of adopting strategies “that more moderate folks could get behind”, in Maya’s words. What happened to Bray’s insistence that “popular support must stem from anti-fascist politics and anti-fascist action, not the other way around” (an antifascism based, let us not forget, on anti-capitalism and direct action)? It was the absence of these “essential” factors that made this action a success.

It must be made very clear that many of the successes that Bray talks about and celebrates — both local examples such as this one or struggles on a larger scale such as Cable Street or the Anti Nazi League — were the result of mobilizations that had nothing to do with his definition of “militant antifascism”. But Bray seems to be totally unaware of this contradiction. I fear that his book, while it is useful for the testimonies he gathers, suffers from a combination of haste and a lack of consistency, rigor and analysis.

Antifa and the fight against fascism today

As discussed throughout this book [this article was written for the book, The Antifascism of the 99%], the far-right is growing across almost the whole planet. And the central argument it raises here is the need for a united struggle to stop it. Antifa movements and the tactics they have used (sometimes successfully) against small local neo-Nazi groups, are not enough in this situation: the same applies to left-wing parties’ activities in the institutions, or to subsidized projects run by NGOs.

To make the point clearer, let’s look at France. The country has an active antifa movement; the left has had considerable electoral success over the years and in some elections the far-left has even won millions of votes; there are several anti-racist NGOs and SOS Racisme was born in France. There is also a very high level of social struggle in general. But Marine Le Pen’s Front National (now rebranded as “Rassemblement National”) is in the position that it is. What there hasn’t been in France is sustained effort to build a united movement against fascism.

Does the insistence on the need for a united movement mean arguing that radical antifascist activists have no role to play? Not at all.

If we look at the experience of Unitat Contra el Feixisme i el Racisme, UCFR, the united movement in Catalunya, we can see that radical antifa activists have participated from the beginning. Half a dozen of the twenty-five people who signed the initial call for UCFR came from radical antifa.[6] The first local UCFR groups were started by antifa activists drawing in other local people to do so; this was the case with UCFR Osona, launched by activists of the Antifascist Coordination of Osona, who had grown tired of being a small group in the face of a growing Eurofascist party, Plataforma per Catalunya, in the home town of its then leader. Over time, more and more antifa activists have become convinced of the value of UCFR.

The key point is to see that there is no need for a clash between radical antifa groups and the united movement, in the same way that there is no conflict between belonging to a party or a union and being a UCFR activist. If one accepts the definition of an antifa group as revolutionary and anti-capitalist, it is actually more a political organization than a social movement. It has the same reason and right to exist as any other political organization. What it cannot do is demand that everyone else adopts their political vision as a condition for being able to participate in struggles against the far-right, still less in struggles against racism.

The solution which enables an antifa group to maintain its own political position without concessions, while at the same time collaborating on equal terms with a wider range of people, is a united movement in which neither the anti-capitalist activists nor the more moderate sectors have to abandon their own vision. They simply work together in the specific fight against fascism, full stop.

If this solution is accepted, radical antifa activists can play a very important role. In many neighborhoods or towns, these will be the first people to note the appearance of the fascists; they will be the first people to realize that an answer is needed and to be inclined to activate it.

Often, antifa groups will already know the different far-right activists present in their territory; this can be very useful for identifying prominent individuals at a fascist demonstration or an alt-right event. (It must also be said that this may bring the danger of becoming obsessed with long standing neo-Nazi geeks who are not going to build anything, while ignoring new forces that may represent a much greater danger.)

On a more practical issue, if it is agreed that a united demonstration against the fascists requires stewards capable of resisting possible attacks, it would be very useful to have people who have that ability… and such people exist in the antifa movement. But the same principles should be applied as with other technical aspects. Specific skills are required to design a good poster, but the graphic designer does not decide the route, date or slogan of the demonstration, but rather uses his or her technical knowledge to carry out the collective democratic decisions of the group. The same principle should apply to a stewarding group: if it has been decided that its function is to protect the demonstration and keep things calm, that is what it should do, not provoke fights with the fascists, for example.

The challenge is to understand that the symbols and the political vision of radical antifa are precisely that: the heritage of one sector of the movement. Neither the red antifa flag, nor the banners of a trade union, or of a reformist political party… can represent the whole of a broad movement. But all of these, along with many other things, do form part of this breadth and must be visible, without one or the other prevailing over the rest.

The consensus position of a united movement is based on the lowest common denominator; it includes neither the full political program of an antifa group nor the electoral promises of a parliamentary party. But it goes without saying that each of the bodies that make up the united movement will continue to defend its own vision, in its own name. The independent actions carried out by each sector of the movement are their own business, provided they don’t contradict that lowest common denominator which is the rejection of fascism.

On the left it is always easier to divide and separate than to unite in struggle. Activists from any viewpoints can have difficulties in accepting the model of united struggle. There is always a tendency to think that the best thing is what I do and how I think. This is normal. What you can’t do is, basing yourself on this assumption, to just impose your own vision. This applies equally to activists of the revolutionary left, in mainstream trade unions, or in a reformist party.

With the current growth of fascism, there is a lot at stake. The united model has demonstrated its effectiveness in the face of the current challenges of a growing far-right. The best tribute to the decades of committed struggle by the antifa movement — often fighting alone — is today to participate in and bring their abilities to the united struggle, in which nobody has to stop being what they are.

Bibliography

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Notes

[1]    It was recovered in the form of the Anti Nazi League (ANL) established in Great Britain in 1978. Bray celebrates the success of the ANL but seems not to recognize that it represented a very different strategy from that of Antifa. Bray 2017, pp46-48; p175.

[2]    Let us note for the record that Bakunin did not ignore women; he also assigned them categories: “First, those frivolous, thoughtless, and vapid women, whom we shall use as we use the third and fourth category of men. Second, women who are ardent, capable, and devoted, but whom do not belong to us because they have not yet achieved a passionless and austere revolutionary understanding; these must be used like the men of the fifth category…” Alcalde 2008.

Author’s note to the English translation: The online versions of this text in English express doubts about its authorship. However, a similar spirit is visible in another text that is definitely Bakunin’s:

“We must produce anarchy and, like invisible pilots in the thick of the popular tempest, we must steer it not by any open power but by the collective dictatorship of all the allies… Few allies, but good ones — energetic, discreet, loyal… Strong men.” Bakunin 1973, p180.

[3]    When I can avoid it, I don’t put links to fascist pages.

[4]    Traverso strongly rejects the concept of “Islamo-fascism.” He declares: “The intense appeal to this notion by xenophobes of all sectors… creates many misunderstandings and should lead us to take some precautions before using it.” Traverso 2016.

[5]    Its then leader, Jordi de la Fuente, participated in the name of the MSR at an SNSP event in Beirut. Later he was a member of the Le Pen type party, Platforma per Catalunya, and at the time of writing he has just joined the Spanish far-right party, VOX.

[6]    See UCFR 2010.